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________________ 
 
OPINION 
________________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 As established by Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), 
the right to remain silent contains an implicit promise that a 
defendant’s post-Miranda silence will not carry adverse 
consequences.  This promise prohibits a prosecutor from 
impeaching a defendant with his or her post-Miranda silence.  
Otherwise, a prosecutor could diminish a defendant’s 
credibility by suggesting that a defendant’s silence raises 
suspicion, thereby burdening the defendant’s right to remain 
silent with a costly, unconstitutional penalty.  Victor Lopez 
argues that he bore this cost when the Government impeached 
him with his post-Miranda silence and that this error satisfies 
plain error review.  We agree.  Therefore, we will vacate his 
conviction and remand for a new trial.   
I. 
 Victor Lopez was convicted of possessing a firearm as 
a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).  The 
sole contested issue at trial was whether Lopez indeed 
possessed a gun.  In this regard, the jury heard testimony from 
Lopez and from the arresting officers, Paul Martinez and 
Miguel Ramos.  The jurors were faced with the decision of 
whether to believe the officers’ testimony that they found a 
gun in Lopez’s pocket or to believe Lopez’s testimony that 
the police framed him.  In light of this conflicting testimony 
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and the paucity of other evidence, Lopez’s credibility was 
crucial to his defense.   
 Officers Martinez and Ramos testified fairly 
consistently regarding their encounter with Lopez and an 
unidentified man around midnight on September 13, 2012, 
though there were some discrepancies in their recollection of 
events.  Generally speaking, the officers individually 
responded to a possible burglary in progress at an apartment 
building, saw Lopez and an unidentified man about to exit the 
building, and questioned the men.  Eventually, Officer 
Martinez asked the men to step outside and put their hands 
against the wall.  When Officer Martinez searched Lopez, he 
saw a gun in Lopez’s pocket.  Then, while Officer Martinez 
was handcuffing Lopez, the unidentified man left the scene.  
The officers then took Lopez to the precinct for booking, 
where Lopez gave officers the name of his brother, Alex 
Lopez, rather than his own.  
 Lopez, on the other hand, testified that the officers 
framed him for possessing the gun and that he was only at the 
apartment building to take a woman home after their date that 
evening.  He testified that his friend Pagan had driven him to 
the apartment building earlier that night, that he had taken a 
woman named Crystal on a date, and that he had taken 
Crystal back to her apartment shortly before midnight.  
Around midnight, Lopez was nearing the apartment’s exit at 
the same time as an unknown, unidentified man.  Lopez 
testified that he saw police officers outside of the apartment 
building.  As he exited, he testified that an officer threw him 
against the wall.  While Lopez was held against the wall, 
Lopez said he heard the unidentified man tussling with the 
second officer and that it sounded like the unidentified man 
ran away.  Then, Lopez heard officers say that there was a 
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gun, and the officers told Lopez to identify the man who 
escaped or else Lopez would be arrested.  Lopez testified that 
he did not know the other man, that he never had the gun, and 
that he had not seen the gun before.  He admitted that when 
he was taken to the precinct, however, he gave officers his 
brother’s name rather than his own.  He also testified that he 
had prior felony convictions. 
 Regarding the gun possession charge, Lopez received 
a Miranda warning on the day of his arrest.  After receiving 
this warning, Lopez did not say that he had been framed by 
the police until he testified at trial.  During the Government’s 
cross-examination, the Government undercut Lopez’s 
testimony with the following exchange:  
Q    So essentially you got 
charged with a gun that 
you claim you did not 
possess, correct? 
A     Yes, sir. 
Q  You’re being wrongfully 
charged, correct? 
A  Yes, sir. 
Q  You’re being framed for 
this gun, right? 
A  Yes, sir. 
Q  The next day, did you tell 
anybody about what 
happened? 
A  Tell anyone like who? 
Q  Anybody. Did you call up 
Crystal and say, “Hey, 
guess what happened last 
night?” 
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A  No, I did not call Crystal. 
Q  Okay. Did you tell your 
friend Pagan who had 
driven you there? 
A  No, I did not speak to no 
one. 
Q  You didn’t tell anybody 
that you were just framed 
the night before, did you? 
A  No, I did not. 
Q  How about after the -- 
A  I got a -- 
Q  -- next day? At any point, 
from the next day until just 
before this trial, did you 
tell anybody, “I was 
framed  by the 
police?” 
A  Absolutely. 
Q  Okay. Who’d you tell? 
A  I tell other individuals. 
Q  Who? 
A  Friends. 
Q  Who? Do you have a 
name? 
A  They’re not here at the 
moment. 
Q  And where are they? 
A  They’re at home. 
Q  Did you tell them you were 
on trial today? 
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A  No, I did not. I don’t have 
no contact with no one but 
my family. 
Q  And you -- have you ever 
made a complaint against a 
police officer in the past? 
A  No, sir. 
Q  Do you know how easy 
that would be to file a 
complaint against a -- 
 
[Lopez’s Counsel]: 
Objection to how 
easy it would be. 
THE COURT: 
sustained. 
 
(App. 266-68.) 
 Then, in its closing argument, the Government referred 
to this exchange and challenged Lopez’s credibility on the 
basis that he did not tell anyone that he had been framed by 
the police before trial.  Specifically, the Government stated: 
 Let’s think back to 
defendant’s testimony yesterday.  
He said that Officer Martinez 
roughed him up, threw him 
against a wall, punched his face 
into a wall, and threatened him 
physically, and also threatened 
him with sending him to jail.  And 
this made defendant fear for his 
life and his freedom.  But he 
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didn’t fear for his freedom enough 
to do anything about it.  Until 
today, he said nothing about this 
conduct to anyone who could 
make a difference.    
 . . . Wouldn’t you expect 
him to file a complaint with the 
police about Officer Martinez’s 
conduct, especially since 
defendant testified that there was 
a crowd of onlookers that 
gathered while the arrest was 
taking place?  But he never 
reported the behavior to the 
police, to anyone at the jail, to the 
Prosecutor’s Office, to his 
congressman.  He testified that he 
told a few friends, but he couldn’t 
tell us who they were.  He 
explained that he was in jail and 
couldn’t make phone calls, but he 
admitted he could speak to his 
family, and did.  And he also 
admitted that he could write 
letters.  Yet he did nothing to 
report what he describes as 
abusive conduct by any -- by an 
authority figure, by the police. 
 . . . . 
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 An innocent man framed, 
sitting in jail, and that’s all he did 
until he took the stand yesterday.   
 Compare all of this to 
Officer Ramos and Officer 
Martinez’s testimony.  The 
officers’ testimony simply makes 
more sense. 
(App. 374-75.) 
 The jury convicted Lopez of possession of a firearm as 
a convicted felon.1 He was sentenced to 70 months’ 
imprisonment.  This appeal followed.   
                                              
 1 It appears that the jurors struggled with their 
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, sending six 
questions to the District Court during deliberations, asking:   
(1) “Were there any security 
cameras in use on the night of the 
occurrence, and what did they 
show?”  
(2) “What items were in Victor’s 
possession packet when he was 
released from the jail?” 
(3) “Is there documentation to 
prove that Crystal lived in 
Apartment Number 10 or a rental 
agreement?” 
(4) “Why were the aunt, José 
Pagan, and Crystal not questioned 
and called to be witnesses?” 
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II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 
3231, and we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.  We review an unpreserved Doyle violation for plain 
error.  See United States v. Shannon, 766 F.3d 346, 355 n.12 
(3d Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Balter, 91 F.3d 427, 
441 (3d Cir. 1996)).  Under this framework, an appellant must 
show: “(1) there is an ‘error’; (2) the error is ‘clear or 
obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute’; (3) the 
error ‘affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the 
ordinary case means’ it ‘affected the outcome of the district 
court proceedings’; and (4) ‘the error seriously affect[s] the 
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings.’”  United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262 
(2010) (quoting Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 
(2009)).   
III. 
 On appeal, Lopez argues that the Government violated 
his due process rights under Doyle v. Ohio by impeaching 
                                                                                                     
(5) “Is it standard procedure for 
both policemen to write a report? 
If only one is required to write a 
report, is the other required to 
write a witness statement?” 
(6) “Was the weapon checked for 
fingerprints, including bullets, 
magazine, and cartridge? If so, 
what were the results?” 
(App. 434-35.) 
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him with his post-Miranda silence and that this error satisfies 
plain error review.2  Although the Government concedes that 
one of its cross-examination questions arguably violates 
Doyle, the Government contends that legitimate impeachment 
evidence offsets any Doyle violation and that Lopez cannot 
satisfy plain error review.3  We will begin by discussing the 
Doyle violation before turning to the four-part test for plain 
error review. 
A. 
 In Doyle v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held that it is a 
violation of due process to impeach a defendant’s testimony, 
told for the first time at trial, with the defendant’s post-
Miranda silence.  426 U.S. at 611, 619.  In that case, a state 
prosecutor sought to discredit the defendant’s testimony that 
he had been framed, which he told for the first time during 
trial, by inquiring why he did not tell his story earlier.  See id. 
                                              
2 Lopez also argues that his Confrontation Clause 
rights were violated, but we need not address this argument 
because we hold that a new trial is required on the basis of the 
Doyle violation. 
 
3 In its answering brief, the government argued that 
many of the questions implicating Doyle actually related to a 
time period after Lopez was arrested but before he received 
Miranda warnings.  A subsequent submission to expand the 
record, however, demonstrates that Lopez received Miranda 
warnings the morning of his arrest, which the government 
acknowledged in its sur-reply.  We therefore need not address 
the government's arguments about Doyle rights between 
arrest and Miranda warnings because those events were 
essentially contemporaneous in this case.  
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at 613.  The State “argue[d] that the discrepancy between an 
exculpatory story at trial and silence at time of arrest gives 
rise to an inference that the story was fabricated somewhere 
along the way.”  Id. at 616.  The Supreme Court disagreed.  
Id. at 617-20.  In holding that the inference sought to be 
drawn by the prosecution was improper, the Supreme Court 
highlighted the “insolubly ambiguous” nature of a 
defendant’s post-Miranda silence and the unfairness that 
would result from impeaching a defendant’s testimony with 
this silence.  See id. at 617-18.  The Supreme Court 
emphasized that “while it is true that the Miranda warnings 
contain no express assurance that silence will carry no 
penalty, such assurance is implicit to any person who receives 
the warnings.”  Id. at 618.  More specifically, the Supreme 
Court stated that “it would be fundamentally unfair and a 
deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person’s 
silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently 
offered at trial.”  Id.  
 As in Doyle, Lopez remained silent after his arrest, 
waiting until trial to proclaim that he was framed for 
possessing the gun.  When the Government cross-examined 
him, the prosecutor challenged Lopez’s defense by repeatedly 
asking whether he told anyone that he had been framed at an 
earlier time.  Specifically, there were at least three 
impermissible questions: (1) “did you tell anybody about 
what happened?” (2) “You didn’t tell anybody that you were 
just framed the night before, did you?” and (3) “At any point, 
from the next day until just before this trial, did you tell 
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anybody, ‘I was framed by the police?’”4   (App. 266-67.)  
The Government emphasized this exchange in its closing.5   
                                              
 4 In view of the other Doyle errors, we need not decide 
whether the Government’s questions regarding whether 
Lopez told Crystal or Pagan that he had been framed, 
standing alone, also violate due process.  
 
 
5 We have identified at least seven statements in the 
Government’s closing that invite the impermissible inference 
that Lopez’s silence and decision to maintain that silence 
imply he fabricated his trial testimony:  
(1) “But he didn’t fear for his 
freedom enough to do anything 
about it.”   
(2) “Until today, he said nothing 
about this conduct to anyone who 
could make a difference.”   
(3) “Wouldn’t you expect him to 
file a complaint with the police 
about Officer Martinez’s conduct, 
especially since defendant 
testified that there was a crowd of 
onlookers that gathered while the 
arrest was taking place?”   
(4) “But he never reported the 
behavior to the police, to anyone 
at the jail, to the Prosecutor’s 
Office, to his congressman.” 
(5) “Yet he did nothing to report 
what he describes as abusive 
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 The Government’s impermissible cross-examination 
here is distressingly similar to the questioning in Doyle.  In 
both cases, the prosecutor challenged the defendant’s silence 
and failure to tell the police about being framed before 
testifying at trial.  Cf. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 613-14.  Also in 
both cases, the questioning was intended to raise the 
impermissible inference that the defendant fabricated his 
story sometime before trial and that the defendant’s testimony 
was therefore not credible.  See id. at 616-17.  Moreover, the 
Government relied on this improper impeachment in closing 
by inviting the jury to construe Lopez’s silence against him 
and to find that the officers were more credible than Lopez.  
This impeachment strategy was soundly rejected in Doyle v. 
Ohio.6  Whether this violation satisfies plain error review, 
however, is a separate question that we now address. 
                                                                                                     
conduct by any -- by an authority 
figure, by the police.” 
(6) “An innocent man framed, 
sitting in jail, and that’s all he did 
until he took the stand yesterday.”   
 (App. 374-75.) 
 
 6 We also note that the Government’s closing 
argument discusses both Lopez’s post-Miranda silence and 
his failure to file a police misconduct report.  Although the 
Government argues that Lopez’s failure to file a police 
misconduct report might not have been motivated by his right 
to remain silent, and that a defendant’s silence must be 
motivated by a Miranda warning for Doyle to apply, the 
Government’s argument here misses the mark.  The proper 
focus is the inference the Government sought to draw from 
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B. 
 As discussed above, the Government violated Doyle 
by impeaching Lopez’s trial testimony with his post-Miranda 
silence and by inviting the jury to infer that Lopez’s 
testimony was a fabrication based on this silence.  Thus, the 
first two steps of plain error review are satisfied.  That is, 
there was “an error or defect” in Lopez’s trial, and that error 
is “clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable 
dispute.”  See Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135.  
                                                                                                     
Lopez’s post-Miranda silence.  Cf. Hassine v. Zimmerman, 
160 F.3d 941, 949 (3d Cir. 1998) (“We believe that questions 
like this [‘[y]ou sat for seven months in prison with the 
knowledge of what was really involved in regard to the his 
gun, and you just kept it to yourself because your attorney 
said to keep it to yourself?’] clearly invite the jury—in 
violation of Doyle—to reject Hassine’s story and to infer that 
Hassine’s post-arrest silence was a sign of his guilt.”).  Here, 
the Government sought to use Lopez’s post-Miranda silence 
(including his failure to file a police misconduct report) to 
suggest that Lopez’s defense, told for the first time at trial, 
was a fabrication.  This inference is impermissible.  To find 
otherwise would allow a prosecutor to circumvent Doyle by 
asking the defendant why he did not take some type of 
affirmative action in his defense, despite being prohibited 
from asking why the defendant failed to speak in his defense.  
This result would be incongruous.  The implicit promise in 
Miranda warnings is that a defendant’s silence will not be 
used against him, such that a defendant has the right to 
remain silent and to maintain that silence by not filing a 
police misconduct report.  
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 The third step of this analysis addresses whether “the 
error ‘affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the 
ordinary case means’ it ‘affected the outcome of the district 
court proceedings.’”  Marcus, 560 U.S. at 262 (quoting 
Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135).  Here, there is a reasonable 
probability that the Doyle violation affected the outcome of 
Lopez’s trial.  Marcus, 560 U.S. at 262.  After hearing 
testimony from the officers and from Lopez, the jury faced a 
credibility determination: Should they believe the officers’ 
testimony that Lopez possessed a gun, or Lopez’s testimony 
that the officers framed him?  As such, Lopez’s credibility 
was integral to his defense, and the Government’s repeated 
references to his post-Miranda silence diminished his 
credibility.7  Indeed, the jury struggled with the competing 
factual testimony here as evidenced by the questions it sent to 
the District Court attempting to elicit additional facts about 
                                              
 7 Absent this impermissible impeachment, the 
Government argues that the jury would have questioned 
Lopez’s credibility because of his prior felony convictions 
and the fact that he initially gave a false name.  The 
Government contends that this legitimate impeachment 
offsets its impermissible impeachment.  We disagree, because 
the legitimate impeachment evidence merely drew Lopez's 
general credibility into question and did not create as direct 
an inference that Lopez's story of being framed was a recent 
fabrication.  The Government's Doyle violation more 
powerfully created this inference, and it did so improperly by 
undermining the defendant's exercise of his constitutional 
rights.  We therefore conclude that there is a reasonable 
probability that this violation affected the outcome of Lopez's 
trial. 
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the incident.8  Because Lopez’s defense depended entirely on 
his credibility as compared to the officers’ credibility, we find 
that the Government’s impermissible impeachment of 
Lopez’s testimony diminished his credibility in a manner that 
created a reasonable probability that this error affected the 
outcome of his trial.  Thus, the third step of this analysis is 
satisfied.  
 The fourth and final step of this analysis is whether 
“the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings.”  Marcus, 560 U.S. at 262 
(quoting Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135).  This fourth step of plain 
error review erects a high hurdle, surmounted only in “those 
circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would 
otherwise result.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 
(1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).  This demanding 
test is met here in view of the fact that the case hinged 
entirely on the relative credibility of Lopez and the officers, 
with no corroborating evidence for either side’s account; the 
Doyle violation was blatant; and the government’s repeated 
emphasis of the error in closing argument exacerbated the 
prejudice from the violation.  Under these circumstances, the 
government’s conduct did indeed undermine the fairness, 
                                              
 8 As noted above, the jury asked whether there was any 
security camera footage, whether Lopez had items on him 
when he was arrested, whether Crystal lived in the building, 
why Crystal and Pagan were not called as witnesses, whether 
there were fingerprints on the gun, and whether standard 
police reporting practices were followed.    These questions 
indicate the jury’s difficulty reconciling the competing 
testimony in this case and its concerns about Lopez’s 
testimony. 
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integrity, and reputation of judicial proceedings.9 Because 
we find that the four steps of the plain error analysis are 
satisfied, we will vacate Lopez’s conviction and remand for 
a new trial. 10 
                                              
 9 We note that the Government’s impermissible 
impeachment with Lopez’s post-Miranda silence is 
particularly egregious for its repeated failure to abide by 
precedent precluding such cross examination.  This type of 
error unfortunately resurfaces too often, threatening to 
undermine the integrity of proceedings in our courts.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Shannon, 766 F.3d 346, 358 (3d Cir. 
2014) (Doyle error was not harmless, stating “it is a violation 
of a defendant’s due process rights for a ‘prosecutor . . . to 
impeach a defendant’s exculpatory story, told for the first 
time at trial, by cross-examining the defendant about his 
failure to have told the story after receiving Miranda warnings 
at the time of his arrest.’”) (quoting Doyle, 426 U.S. at 611); 
Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Davis, 561 F.3d 159, 167 (3d Cir. 
2009) (holding that the Doyle error was not harmless because 
“the prosecutor’s impermissible comments about Davis’s 
failure to provide his exculpatory version of the shooting to 
the police went to the core of his theory of defense and, as a 
result, his credibility.”); Woods v. Gov’t of Virgin Islands, 
274 F. App’x 191, 194 (3d Cir. 2008) (non-precedential) 
(holding that the Doyle error satisfied plain error review as 
“the prosecutor’s conduct in this case [was] beneath the level 
of propriety expected of the government.”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 
10
 While we remain troubled by recurring Doyle 
violations, we wish to commend Assistant United States 
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IV. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court’s judgment of October 20, 2014, and remand for a new 
trial.  
                                                                                                     
Attorney Steven G. Sanders for his forthright 
acknowledgment of the Doyle error during oral argument on 
this appeal.  He was a model of professionalism in 
apologizing for the error at trial and vowing to take steps to 
avoid having this type of error recur. 
